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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
.JIYTIL 'WELLS, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
-vs.-
BLF1£ f-lHIELD OF UTAH, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
Case No. 
11871 
ST,\11 E111£K11 OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
Action hy plailltiff to recow-r benefits claimed under 
a medical contract issued by defendant. 
SOTTGHT ON APPEAL 
'rlw Plaintiff and Respondent seeks affirmation of 
the judgment in Plaintiff/Respondt>nt's favor and an 
Order directing tht> Dt>fendant/ Appellant to pay costs 
of this appeal. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Tlw ease came before the court on August 12, 1969, 
OH a l\lotion for Summary Judgment filed by defendant 
and for trial. Defendant's Motion for Summary Judg-
1 
ment was denied (TR 23). Submitted with said motio: 
and received in evidence by the court was the medica 
pre-payment contract issued by defendant (Exhibit '·A'' 
TR 24). On motion of the plaintiff, plaintiff's depositi1·1 
was also received in evidence. Portions of this depositirr 
were read in the record. 
Upon the denial of defendant's Motion for Summary 
Judgment plaintiff made an oral Motion for Summary 
Judgment based upon the pleadings and the evidence in. 
asmuch as no fnrtlwr Pvidence ·was required for deter 
mination of the case; tlw defrndant stipulated that sairi 
motion might be considered immediately without noticr. 
The court granted the motion of the plaintiff and 
that judgment be entered in favor of plaintiff for $7SO.U11 
plus costs (TR 23). 
Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of La11 
were signed and entered by the court on or about Angmi 
26, 1969. Thereafter defendant filf'd a motion nndPr 
rules 52B, 59A and 59E to amend the findings of fact. 
conclusions of law and judgment, or in the alternatiw 
for a new trial. Defendant's motion to amend was }ward 
on September 9, 1969. ThP court granted def endant'f 
motion to amend the conclusions of law and judgment 
(TR 34, 35 and 36). 
On April 16, 1968, plaintiff was injnred in an acci· 
dent at his home in Corinne, Utah, while he was attempt· 
ing to repair a damaged fuel tank. Hp was using a jack 
on the inside of this tank, when it slipped whilf' nndrr 
pressure and the handle struek plaintiff in the month 
2 
(]ii.\.: d·r; p. 'l'R 4-5). This accident broke lllain-
tii'i'.-., in11, 'l<)('kPd out tlll'<'l' teeth and broke several 
(li\wr [(-, tl1, and forced his teeth into the back of his 
1Potttl1 I jil.':-; dq>n. ]J. +and 5, TR 4). 
A ftf'l' tlw aecidrnt, plaintiff was taken by his wife 
to tl1P offir<' of Dr. H.J. Griffin, D.D.S. where he received 
treatrnPnt and was then referred to Dr. ·white, 
an oral surgPon, in Tremonton, Uta11, for hospitalization 
and trPahu(•nt of tlie fractnrPcl jaw (TR 5, G, 7). Plaintiff 
was nnd('l' Dr. \Yhite's car0 for ahont S(:'n'n weeks until 
tli<· fractnre ht·alecl (pl. 's de po. p. 7). After his discharge 
11_1 Dr. White, plaintiff rdurnecl to Dr. Griffin for the 
d('ntal rPpairs mad<' necessary as a result of the accident 
(TH li-7). Dr. Griffin 1wrforrned only dental serYices 
for t1H' plaintiff (rrR 8). Plaintiff submitted to defend-
ant tlw bill of Dr. White for oral surgical services per-
fornw<l in tlH· treatment of thl:' fracture which defendant 
paid (TR 7, pl.'s ckpo. p. 7). ·when tlw dental bill of 
Dr. Griffin \\'HI' sulnnittt>d to the dt>fendant, payment was 
<kllied 011 the ground that the contract issued by the de-
frndant to the plaintiff excluded payment for dental 
sPnic<'S and bPeanse Dr. Griffin was not a "participating 
or nonparticipating within the terms of the 
rm•dical contract held by the plaintiff. 
'rJwn' is no dispute regarding the occurrence of the 
at'('i<lPnt wliieh plaintiff sustained on April 16, 1968, nor 
is then• any dispnt<- that at the time of said accident 
plaintiff was a. suhscrihPr to tlw contract issned by de-
f1·ndant to plain ti ff, upon \\'hi<'h this snit was brought, 
or that said ('Ontrnd was in good standing and in full 
f11rr·e arnl dfret on th1• of the accident (TR 9). 
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Plaintiff had obtainPd this contract from defendan1 
through the Fanners' Union of which he was a llH'lllhPr 
and the contract was solicited by an agPnt of d<·frndant 
Plaintiff/Respondent testified that tlwrn wen• no discu!. 
sions about the exclusion of bmefits from the contr::iti 
which he could recall (TR 11). Plaintiff had no n•colh 
tion of any representations concerning thP contract made 
by defendant's agent (pl.'s depo. p. 18-19) and after th1: 
contract ·was delin.•red to plaintiff, he nPVPr read it in any 
detail (pl. 's depo., p 20). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE co:NTRACT BETWEEN THE p ARTIES DOES BY 
ITS TERMS ENTITLE THE PLAINTIFF TO THE BENEFITS 
SUED FOR IN HIS COMPLAINT AND THE CONCLUSIONS 
OF LAW AND THE JUDGMENT OF THE TRIAL COURT 
ARE SUPPORTED BY THE FINDINGS AND THE EV!· 
DENCE. 
The pertinent provisions of the contract in question, 
a copy of which is a part of this Court's record and desig-
nated Defendant's Exhibit "A", read as follows: 
"THIS CONTRACT ... mtitles the subscrilwr 
and family and dependants ... to have, on or after 
the date membership beconws effective hereunder, 
services from the participating physician of their 
choice." (Emphasis supplied) 
Aricle I, Definitions of Tenns, snbsection E, read5 
as follows: 
" 'Participating Physician' shall nwan any doctor 
licensed as a physician and surgeon to practic1· 
4 
medi<'i11e i11 all its branches .... " (Emphasis sup-
! li•·d) 
.'.. rt-icl i I. Svrvices Provided, subsection A(l), reads 
a,.: f11llo>n;: 
"'1'11<· following Sl'rvicE's ... shall he available to 
tlw rnPmher ... when rendered by a participating 
ph;.·sician .... : 
Snrgical sPrvices rt>ndered by a participating 
]Jhysician in tlw treatment of disease, illness or 
injury. Tlw t<·rm 'Surgical Services' shall mean: 
cutting, suturing and opPrative procedures; treat-
ment of fractures and dislocations or orthopedic 
f'asting; 01wrativP and major diagnostic endo-
scopic procPdnres; therapeutic surt,rical injections 
and tlwrapentic surt,rical aspirations; destruction 
of !Psions by Plectrieal means; biopsiPs of internal 
organs." 
.\rticl<> III, Lirnitations and I<Jxclnsions, subsection 
B(7) as [ollows: 
"ThP s<'niees }ffovided hy this contract shall not 
irn·lnde UH' following: 
* * * 
7. Physician services for extraction of teeth 
or other dPntal JffOCPsses." 
Dorland's Illustrated :JI(•dical Dictionary, 23rd Edi-
tion l 95S dPfint>s tJH' following tPnns: 
:.1 Pdicine: ''The art or science of healing diseases; 
es1wciall;.' the healing of disPases b>' the ad-
rnini stra tion of intPrnal remedit>s." 
DPntistr.\·: ''That <lepartnwnt of tlw }waling arts 
wl1ieh is ron('t>rned with the teeth, oral cavity, 
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and associated parts, including the 
and treatment of tlwir diseases and the re. 
storation of defective and missing tissne." 
Physician: "An authorized practitioner of mPdi-
cine." 
It is the position of the Plaintiff /Hesponclent that the 
term "medicine in all its branches" as provided in the 
contract prepared and written by the Defendant/Appel-
lant includes Dentistry and related snrgical repair of 
oral injuries such as tl10sf> sustained in the case at hand. 
Dentistry is a department of the healing arts and deals 
with diagnosis and treatment of diseases and is included 
within the definition of nwdicine. 
The Defendant/ Ap1wllant argues that a ''Dentist" is 
not a "Physician" wihin the definition of Article I of the 
policy in question; however, Article III, subparagraph 
B(7) specifically excludes "Physician" sen·ices renderPd 
for extraction of tedh or other dental processt>s. 
The authors of the contract in question refer to dt>n-
tal services as ''Physician services for extraction of teeth . 
. . . ", thereby admitting that a Dentist is an authoriud 
practitioner of medicine and included within the Clanse 
E, Article I definition of a participating physician prac-
ticing medicine in "all its branches." 
POINT II 
THE CONTRACT BETWEEN THE PARTIES IS Aii!· 
BIGUOUS AND THEREFORE TO BE CONSTRUED LIBER· 
ALLY IN FAVOR OF THE PLAINTIFF. 
As statc'd above, on tl11• one hand, DPfrndant/ Appel· 
lant argues that a "DPntist" is not includPd within tl1e 
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<l<'finition of ''Physician'' within the terms of the contract; 
and on tlie otltPr hand, argues that "Physician Services 
for Pxtraction of teeth or other dental processes," are 
exclrnkd irn;,; coverage in the contract. It is apparent 
u.· • ·::te" 1 }J;; t 1 his contradictory use of the term "Physi-
c·ian" <'Onstitntes an ambiguity. 
'l'lie contract definition of "Participating Physician" 
1:- any doctor licensed as a ''physician and surgeon to 
practice mt'dieinP in all its branches." (Emphasis sup-
plied.) Tlw tt'rm "physician and surgeon" constitutes 
anothl'r amhigllity; dof's the term "and" apply in the 
{'Onjnnctive or disjunctive; that is, are services covered 
which arP sole!:-· the result of surgical Or, 
arP st-nices n•nd<•rPd by a gem·ral practicing physician 
a" wt'll a" those rendPrt>d by a surgeon covered f 
Ttw 1manimous holding of most all courts as well as 
tlw Utah 8u11rPrne Court, is that insurance contracts 
rnnst }w libPrally construed in favor of a policy holder 
or thPreof, wherever possible, and strictly 
<·onstrned against the insnrt'r in order to afford the 
protPction whieh thP insnrt>d was Pndeavoring to secure 
wl1Pn ht' ap1>lit'd for the insurance. Richards v. Standard 
Ar'r:. l11s. Co., :200 Pac. 1017, 58 Ut. 622 (1921); Colovos 
cs. Home J,ife /.its. Co. of N.Y., 28 P.2d 607, 83 Ut. 401 
Gi/Json 1·s. RquitablP Life Ass. Soc. of U.S., 36 
105, 84 Pt. 4S:2 (1934); Browning 11s. Equitable 
Df<' Ass. Soc. of l1.S., 72 P.2d lOGO, 94 Ut. 532, rehearing 
denied SO P.2d 348, 94 Ut. 570 (1937); Tucker vs. N.Y. 
Lde ins. Co., 155 P.2d 173, 107 Ut. 478; Stout vs. Wash-
i11gton Fire a11d Marine Inc. Co., 385 P.2d 608, 14 Ut. 2d 
414. 
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'The Courb> will protect the insnred against obscnr. 
antism in the contract which conveys one meaning t11 
lawyers and another to th<· la.nnan. Appleman, fosnranr·f· 
Law and Practic0, \T ol. 13, SPc. 7 401, Pt ::wq. 
"\Vlwn literal construction of an insurancP })Oli('y 
would lead to manifost injustice to tlw insured and liberal 
but still reasonable constrndion th<·reof \\·onld prewnt 
injustice by not requiring an impossibility, such liberal 
construction should be adopkd. Fidelity and Gas Co. of 
N.Y. 1:s. Groth, 53 N.Y. Snpp. 2d 62:3, affirmed 62 K.Y. 
Supp. 2d SHl, :?70 App. Div. 97G. The mod<:>rn tendene) 
is toward a strid(•r actotmtahility of imrnrers to insnn·ds. 
Giam Ba!vm' rs. Phnc11i.r I 11s. Co. of Hartford Co1111 .. 
36 N.Y. Supp. :2d 598, 178 l\lisc. 887. "\Vhen membPrs of 
the public purchas<:> policies of insurance, tlwy are entitk'(I 
to a broad measure of prot<:>ction to fnlfill their 
reasonable expectations and said insurance should not 
be subjected to technical encumbrances or hidden pitfail1 
and their policies should he constnwd lilwrally in tlwir 
favor. Fidelity & Gas Co. of 1\'T. 1·s. Carll and Ra11111-
gosa, Inc. (DCN J 1965) 24;3 F<:>d. Supp. -lSl, dismissPd 
( C.A.) 365 Fed. 2d 303. 
The Courts have felt that s111ce 
language of insurance policies is select<'d by ont> of tlw 
parties alone, that the languagP employed by that party 
should be construed against it. Thus, if tlw 
of the words employed is doubtful or uncertain, or if for 
any reason an ambig·uity exists either in the policy a 
whole or in portions thereof, the insured should have thl' 
benefit of a favorable construction in such instancr. 
Appleman, Insurance Law and Practice, Supra. 
8 
It ii-:i snbrnitted that when a layman purchases a 
health arnl accident insurance policy, he presumes that 
s>tid insura> ('P will cover personal injury sustained due 
to any and all accidents. The insured in the record testi-
fied that all of tlrn repairs done to his jaw and teeth were 
a direet result of the injury he· sustained through the 
accident testified to. The Plaintiff in fact testified that 
he was unaware that dental services were excluded from 
the contract. 
CONCLUSION 
From a reading of the pertinent provisions of the 
contract in question, one can readily see the ambiguities 
which are created by the express language and the seem-
iHgly inconsistent intentions set forth therein. The 
Plaintiff /Respondent presumed, as do all laymen, that 
any and all injuries resulting from accidents would be 
covered by his acccident policy. To allow the Defendant-
A ppellant to avoid paying a legitimate charge for dental 
serviees incident to accidental injury through obscuran-
tism ·wonld lead to manifest injustice and fly in the face 
of thP almost universal policy of the courts to liberally 
construe insurance contracts in favor of the beneficiary 
therennder, wherever possible to afford the protection 
to the insured which he ·was endeavoring to secure when 
lw applied for the insurance. 
Respectfully submitted, 
KIPP AND CHRISTIAN 
D Garv Christian 
.T.· Frederick 
Attorneys for Plaintiff I 
Respondent 
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